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23 July 1981

# China Report

**POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS**

**(FOUO 9/81)**



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CHINA REPORT  
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS  
(FOUO 9/81)

CONTENTS

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Air, Ground Forces Test Each Other in Combat Exercises (Liu Wenzhong, Li Sherming; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 12 Sep 79).....	1
Shenyang Air Regiment Improves Tactical Training (Wu Baoxiang, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 12 Sep 79) .....	5
Beijing Tank Regiment Trains Cadres in Tactics (Wang Guizian, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 12 Sep 79) .....	6
Artillery Company Improves Tactical Training (Deng Jinnan, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 12 Sep 79) .....	7
Training Reform Vital for Modern Warfare (JIEFANGJUN BAO, 14 Sep 79) .....	8
Communications Play Vital Role in Modern Warfare (Tong Xinchu, Hong Xin; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 17 Sep 79) .....	13
Defense Minister on Importance of Studying Military Theory (JIEFANGJUN BAO, 31 Dec 80) .....	18
Probationary Party Members Must Be Given Timely Consideration (JIEFANGJUN BAO, 31 Dec 80) .....	23
Medic Does Good Work in Border Defense Unit (Chen Deng; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 31 Dec 80) .....	26
PLA Unit Information, Designations (JIEFANGJUN BAO, various dates) .....	27
Information on Military, Other Personnel (JIEFANGJUN BAO, various dates) .....	33

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[III - CC - 80 FOUO]

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

AIR, GROUND FORCES TEST EACH OTHER IN COMBAT EXERCISES

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by staff correspondent Liu Wenzhong [0491 2429 1813] and staff reporter Li Sherming [2621 1957 2494]: "Urumqi Units Organize Air-Ground Combat Exercise"]

[Text] Editor's note: We once reported on a combined arms training exercise organized by some units in which all arms of the ground forces took part and which solved problems of "vehicles, horses, and cannon" on ground that had not been encountered before that time. This time we introduce to everybody an exercise in which the Urumqi Units lumped the air force and the army together and began to change the state of affairs in which the ground and air forces did not encounter each other. This was a further advance in combined arms training.

Training ultimately must pass the test of actual combat. To test oneself in the future by bloody means on the battlefield is not as good as to test oneself beforehand now by bloody means; to "give the game away" to the enemy in the future when one is fighting him is not as good as to "give the game away" to oneself now. Combined air-ground training is a good opportunity for "heaven" and "earth" to test each other. If problems are discovered during peacetime training and solved, then if war comes we can reduce our losses.

The surface involved in combined air-ground training is wide, the departments involved in it are many, and the organization work for it is comparatively complex. The first meeting between air and ground forces is truly not easy. The key to good combined training lies in the command organization's "control of heaven" and "control of earth" and in the leading cadres being enthusiastic and thinking in long-range terms. In this way, we can frequently find opportunities for combined training and can obtain ideal results.

One morning in the last third of August, on a certain training ground in the outskirts of Urumqi, an air-ground combat exercise was being carried out. First, four

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fighter planes screamed overhead, bombing and strafing in waves targets on the ground; the ground forces, making use of undulating hills and defensive works, rapidly dispersed and took cover; then two transport planes released 600 parachute targets at which all sorts of weapons on the ground opened fierce fire; soon afterward, six helicopters landed on the exercise ground, and several hundred hypothetical enemy soldiers, dressed in white clothing and headgear, rushed out from the helicopter cabins and seized a nearby hill. Soldiers of the rapid anti-airborne detachment, coming from six routes, quickly surrounded the hill.... This was a demonstration of air-ground combat put on by the Urumqi Units.

Since mid-year, the Urumqi Units have carried out two of these air-ground combined training exercises. The air force has dispatched several hundred aircraft that dropped over 2,400 parachute targets. Several tens of thousands of army officers and men, militia, and army dependents took part in the exercises, which consisted of air-raid defense, shooting down aircraft, and attacking parachutists and surrounding and annihilating enemy soldiers landed by aircraft. Several tens of army and air force commanders at regimental level and above took part in the organizational command of the combat exercises.

The air-ground combined training has broadened the horizons of the officers and men. The cadres and fighters said happily: This kind of training together, which allows us to see, find, and learn the skills of modern warfare, is a good method. After undergoing the training, they summarized its four advantages.

It gives the trainees a taste of modern warfare and increases their confidence in fighting a modern war. The past exercises in air-raid defense and anti-airborne operations had only consisted of blowing whistles and ringing sirens. There was no basis in the trainees' minds for knowing what, in the final analysis, an air raid and airborne operation were like in modern warfare. This time everybody directly perceived through their senses scenes of aircraft diving, bombing, strafing, the dropping of parachutes and the landing of airborne forces, so that they gained experience, opened their minds, and increased their confidence in using existing equipment for air-raid defense and anti-airborne operations. Learning through the personal experience of reality, the officers and men of the army saw in aircraft the aspect of their great mobility and speed, but also came to know the aspect of their being limited by weather and terrain, and mastered several skills in air-raid defense and anti-airborne operations. The officers and men of the air force directly perceived through their senses the ground forces' movements of dispersing, taking cover, and advancing, became familiar with the surface conditions of a future war zone and got to know something about how to support the army in a future war against aggression.

It promotes the study of knowledge pertaining to all service arms and improves the cadres' organizational command capabilities in coordinated operations. In the combat training, the army and air force mutually pondered methods of dealing with each other, and this is something that cannot be done if one doesn't understand the knowledge pertaining to other service arms. Many army and air force commanders formed study-help pairs and during breaks in the training exercise requested instruction from each other. The air force comrades briefed the army on the types, combat performance, operational principles, and tactical methods of aircraft; the army comrades briefed the air force on the army's weaponry performance and organ-

ization of fire as well as command sequence. They went together to the site for combined training and surveyed the terrain there, and together studied the tactics and techniques of air raids, airborne operations, air-raid defense, and anti-airborne operations. After the exercise they together talked about what they had learned from the experiences and summed up the experiences and lessons of organizational command. Yang Nanyuan [2799 0589 0337], commander of a certain army regiment, at first had little understanding of the knowledge pertaining to the air arm. He modestly learned from Fu Wende [0265 2429 1795], deputy commander of an air force regiment, and gained a clear understanding of aircraft types and their combat performance and tactical methods, and became proficient in the organizational command of air-raid defense and anti-airborne operations. Deputy regimental commander Fu also many times asked regimental commander Yang to brief him about the army's situation and on several occasions took part in ground force exercises consisting of dispersal and concealment and of defending against air raids and countering airborne operations, so that he further understood the ground forces' combat movements at any time during a war, and how to organize groups of planes to cover the advance of our ground forces, to bomb important enemy targets, and to select safe spots for concealment, all of which is beneficial to getting a better grasp of the parts of a combat mission in the realm of airborne operations.

Weak links in training are mutually discovered, and the levels of strategy and tactics are jointly raised. During the exercise, a certain army regiment discovered that air force planes flying over a mountain area dove too high from the ground and did not attack their targets with accuracy, so it immediately made suggestions about this to the air force. The comrades of the air force made a special study of measures to deal with this problem, and in the second exercise when starting their drives the planes were flying at a suitable attitude and again and again hit their targets. The air force discovered that the green-colored camflauge clothing worn by the army soldiers was extremely conspicuous when the soldiers were lying prone on the barren Gobi Desert, and immediately brought this to the attention of the army. Comrades of the army repeatedly studied the terrain and surface features in the Gobi Desert and Xinjiang and remade the camoflaue clothing and nets. Thus, over a thousand soldiers can now lie prone in the Gobi Desert, which is without the slightest cover, and aircraft making many reconnaissance flights at low altitudes cannot discover the troops' hidden position.

Savings are effected in training expenses. In the past, when the army and the air force each organized training, to set up the training grounds and carry out training exercises in shooting down aircraft and countering airborne operations cost the Xinjiang army units 200,000 to 300,000 yuan every year, and the shooting down of balloons cost them several tens of thousands of yuan. Now that the army and air force carry out combined training, both sides have live targets, and it is only necessary to make some parachute targets to insure that the units of the whole region receive training, thereby effecting big savings in training expenses.

Recently the Urumqi Units organized comrades and departments concerned who had taken part in the training exercise to discuss informally the question of how to train well in air-ground coordination. The participants felt that the key to good training in air-ground coordination was for the leaders to have a great deal of resolution and personally grasp this question. For the field armies and divisions, which do not have aircraft, and for the air force, which does not have infantry, if

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one of them thinks of something to do and the other is not enthusiastic, then the training will not be good. In addition, there must be organizational work. The Urumqi Units have set up a training exercise command group, composed of the responsible comrades concerned in the army and air force, which makes joint studies of coordination plans and clearly defines the training exercise mission; which goes to the training sites, organizes the carrying out of the exercises, and timely discovers problems; and which organizes exchange visits between the army and air force and timely sums up experiences and lessons. In order to rationally arrange the training exercise content, each session of combined training must solve one or two problems and gradually increase the degree of difficulty in the training. They realize that, in handling well the relationship between air-ground combined training, they cannot rely solely on combined training and become lax about peacetime training in shooting at flying models, shooting at balloons, and shooting at ground targets, and must organically combine the two kinds of training.

9727

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4  
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**MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY**

**SHENYANG AIR REGIMENT IMPROVES TACTICAL TRAINING**

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Wu Baoxiang [0124 0202 4382] et al.: "A Certain Air Regiment Makes New Strides in Tactical Training"]

[Text] Members of a certain air regiment of the Shenyang Units Air Force have emancipated their minds, been bold in practice, and made new strides in tactical training.

This regiment last year completed the most advanced training outline. In order to improve its tactical training, they took three measures: First, they changed the original drill training to comprehensive drill training. In the original drill fighter plane training outline, there had been a total of over 300 exercises, and, in order to meet the demands, the pilots, after finishing the flight outline, were normally required to review and strengthen 35 exercises. The content of some of these experiences was duplicative and time was wasted. The regiment, integrating practice with experience, made a study. It extracted the main content from 35 exercises and synthesized this content into 4 exercises, both maintaining fundamental techniques and saving time in the tactical training and the study of tactical theory for modern warfare. Second, the regiment broke through the limits prescribed by altitude and weather and rationally strung together interrelated parts of the training. After the special skill topics were improved, on one flight there was training in both high-altitude and middle-altitude special skills, in both simple and complicated special skills, and the time that the aircraft returned to base was also used for firing at ground targets. Thus, the flying weather utilization rate was raised and the pilots were tempered in the tactics and techniques of actual combat. Third, the regiment appropriately increased the degree of difficulty in the training and narrowed the gap between training and actual combat. For the training in attacking bombers, the regiment, focusing on the characteristics of the main types of enemy bombers, viz, high speed and strong regenerative capacity, strengthened training in entering the attack position at a wide angle and attacking the bombers at high speed.

9727

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**BEIJING TANK REGIMENT TRAINS CADRES IN TACTICS**

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Wang Guizian [3769 6311 7341] et al.: "A Certain Tank Regiment Conducts Tactical Training Class for New Cadres"]

[Text] A certain tank regiment of the Beijing Units recently focused on this problem: most of its company and platoon cadres had been promoted from the positions of tank commander, chief gunner, and driver and, although their level of specialized techniques was quite high they were comparatively deficient in their capacity for organizational command. Therefore, the regiment started a training class for military cadres, political cadres, and technical cadres, stressing the study of single-tank attack and defense and a tank company's attack on a defending enemy and its own defense. It also set aside a fixed time for studying military topography and knowledge pertaining to staff work and to tank communications and firing. Everybody said happily: "In the past training we didn't know where to put our energy. The regiment has now conducted this training class for us, so that we have learned methods and there is a place to put our energy!"

9727

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ARTILLERY COMPANY IMPROVES TACTICAL TRAINING

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Deng Jinnan [6772 6855 0589] et al.: "2d Artillery Company Trains Fighters in Capacity To Handle Complex Situations"]

[Text] The 2d Artillery Company of Unit 32343, starting from the requirements of actual combat, has taken effective measures to get a good grip on the tactical training of artillerymen, improving their skills in coordinated operations.

In the past, there was not sufficient attention paid to the tactical training of the artillerymen of this company. They earnestly studied the experience of the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, and deeply felt: Artillerymen must not only be proficient in special techniques but also be proficient in tactical movements, so that on the battlefield they can even better wipe out the enemy and preserve themselves. Therefore, they tightly grasped tactical training, stressing the essential tactical movements of individual soldiers, viz, the gunner dropping to a prone position, standing up, and moving under enemy fire. They also paid attention in the training to setting up all sorts of enemy situations such as air raids, enemy artillery fire blocks, and attacks by atomic and chemical weapons, training the gunners' capacity to handle complex situations. They got a good grip on coordinated tactical training of squads and platoons in order to build a good foundation for coordinated training of companies. Moreover, they engaged in exercises in infantry-artillery coordination, grasped the organizational command by commanders at all levels and stressed the improvement of their command of coordinated operations. Because the measures were suitable, the tactical level of the cadres and fighters rose very quickly. In one live-ammunition training exercise of storming a heavily fortified position in a hilly area, for which infantry were attached to the company, the 2d Artillery Company was bold, powerful, and flexible in its tactical movements, for which it was commended by the commander at the higher level.

9727

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**TRAINING REFORM VITAL FOR MODERN WARFARE**

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 14 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by special staff commentator: "Straighten Out the Ideological Line, Effectively Reform Training"]

[Text] The discussion on "how training can meet the demands of modernized warfare" launched by JIEFANGJUN BAO has been going on for 10 months, from November of last year to the present time, and is about to be brought to a temporary close. The editorial department has asked us to write a brief summary of the discussion. We think that a discussion obviously must be carried out in stages and have a beginning and end, but, with regard to actual work, the inquiry into this problem is just beginning and the solution of this problem is a long-term task. Therefore, we do not now present definitive opinions. In one sense, by endorsing opinions in this discussion, we are extending the discussion of the criterion for truth into the realm of military training, so as to truly straighten out the ideological line of leaders at all levels, to emancipate their minds, and to reform training.

Military training needs to be reformed--this is a demand imposed on us by warfare under modern conditions and is also the core of the discussion of this problem. In modern warfare, following the developments in science and technology and their applications in the military field, there have been very big changes in weaponry and equipment and the mode of operations of the enemy side and our side. For example, modernized strategic weapons of the thermonuclear and space variety as well as the newest modern tactical weapons of the conventional variety have appeared, and they have led to an unprecedented increase in the surprise and destructiveness, the mobility and speed, of warfare; the target of ground operations has changed from being primarily infantry to being primarily tanks and armored forces. The large scale of warfare, the breadth of the operational zone, the large number of service arms that take part in war, and the swiftness of change in the situation all surpass those in our previous experience of war. These new conditions and new features make new demands on our military training. At the beginning of the 1950's, Comrade Mao Zedong emphatically pointed out: "In order to defend the motherland from the aggression of the imperialists, it is not enough to depend on the equipment and tactics we used in the past against the domestic enemies. We must master the newest equipment and the newest tactics that go along with it." Military training must, based on the continually changing new situation, continually be reformed. This, of course is a question of commonsense. However, for many years Lin Biao and the "gang of four" and their ilk, under the pretext of advocating "revolutionization," wrecked revolutionization and modernization; advocated "mule-ization" and opposed motorization; and advocated "skill in fighting within 200 meters of the enemy" and opposed

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technological and tactical training under modern conditions. This caused our army's training to stagnate for a long period of time and to focus on old equipment, old training content, and old training methods. After the smashing of the "gang of four" and through criticism of Lin Biao and the "gang of four," order was brought out of chaos and our army's military training made marked progress. But this progress, to a great degree, is still in the nature of a recovery. Strictly speaking, the training is still not on the right track.

Since the beginning of last year, the discussion on a national scale concerning the question of the criterion for truth has evoked a great response on all fronts, including the military front. Applying the number one viewpoint, practice, people are thinking deeply about a severe problem: Can we now allow this state of affairs in our army's training to continue? Can the training content, methods, and systems followed for many years pass the test of modern warfare? Must military training be reformed, and how can it be reformed so as to step up combat readiness and fit in with actual combat? Voices urging that the training be reformed have become even stronger after the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam. And it is precisely under these conditions that the great number of officers and men devote a great deal of attention to the discussion of "how training can meet the requirements of modern warfare." Many units, drawing on the experience of the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, basing themselves on existing equipment and keeping in mind a future war, have boldly carried out some reforms in training, and some of them have already garnered some preliminary experiences. This is extremely valuable. However, we must also see that this is only a beginning. The major problem at present is that minds have not been emancipated and that the training reform has not been set in motion. There are many reasons; some are questions of material conditions, some of experience, some of the spiritual state of mind, but the main reason is that, in thought, the state of ossification or semi-ossification has not been thoroughly broken away from. Some comrades are still habituated to get all their mental sustenance from "books" and make outdated experience and formulations their standards; some comrades are content with training in bayonet charges, hand grenade throwing, and in the experience of a single service arm, and do not study the new conditions and new problems of modern warfare; some leaders do not themselves grasp reform and also do not support other people making reform, and even pour cold water on the masses' enthusiasm. The abovementioned variety of reasons fully demonstrate that the key to whether one dares to reform training is whether one's mind has been emancipated. If the mind is not emancipated then training reform cannot take a single step and does not have the slightest hope. A correct ideological line is determined on the basis of a correct political line and also on the basis of a correct military line. Only by integrating military training with reality, straightening out the ideological line, and greatly emancipating the mind can training reform make considerable progress.

In emancipating the mind and reforming training, we must first of all liberate people from the spiritual state of going by the "book" in everything, and correctly handle Mao Zedong's military thought. Comrade Mao Zedong, in leading the Chinese people in armed struggle over a long period of time, summed up his rich experiences in war, and Mao Zedong's military thought is the compass guiding the study of our army's strategy and tactics and the carrying out of its military training. We can never be shaken on this point. The problem is that, under the influence of the leftist line of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" for over 10 years, the "every sentence is true" and "every sentence must be complied with" became tight chains

fettering people's minds and there existed a state of ossification in the realm of military training, as if after the great teacher of the revolution had made the leap from practice to theory, knowledge had stopped and we did not need to use our brains again. Therefore, reciting from memory and citing words and phrases were substituted for the study, probing into, and solution of actual problems; certain regulations, teaching materials, and manuals became loaded with the "quotations" and they cited principles, and new conditions and new problems were dismissed; and training in tactics and technology was oversimplified and imitative. If we now continue to be under the influence of this way of thinking--whatever was written in the "books" without exception cannot be changed and whatever was not written without exception cannot be spoken of, cannot be done and even cannot be thought about--then what training reform can be discussed? We must make clear: First, the universal principles of Mao Zedong's military thought are only a compass guiding our study of problem and definitely should not and cannot be readymade answers for the solution of all sorts of actual problems; Comrade Mao Zedong did not and could not solve all concrete problems brought about by developmental changes. This means that we can only, in line with the application of the standpoint, viewpoint, and methods of Comrade Mao Zedong's study of warfare, boldly inquire into and solve problems by using the scientific attitude. Second, although Comrade Mao Zedong put forward many correct methods for the solution of many problems, he did this at a fixed time and place and under fixed conditions. If we do not inquire about changes in conditions and make his military thought a never-changing dogma that is indiscriminately copied and used without any exception whatsoever, then we will inevitably suffer a setback in practice. Since Mao Zedong's military thought is the crystallization of nonproletarian military science, we must adopt the scientific attitude in dealing with it. Mao Zedong's military thought is a product of the practice of the revolutionary masses in their millions, and can and must be developed through the revolutionary practice of the masses. The kind of attitude that makes Mao Zedong's military thought a panacea for all ills, or a religious creed about which we dare not express the slightest reservation, is antiscientific and, of course, runs counter to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Only by continuing to break the spiritual shackles forged by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" can we truly, with Mao Zedong's military thought as our compass, in the vast world of training study new conditions, solve new problems, "start the machinery," move about freely and quickly, and continually score achievements in training reform.

In emancipating the mind and reforming training, we must extricate ourselves from the negative feeling that "with the existing equipment there is nothing to be attempted and nothing to be accomplished." Comrade Zhu De, in "Battlefields in the Liberated Areas," said: "Our view on using military forces can be summarized as follows: fight with what ever guns we have, fight whatever enemy we face, fight in whatever time or place we have to." What he said about weapons, the enemy's situation, time, and place is the standpoint for using military forces in war and is also our standpoint for reforming training. Proceeding from the reality of the enemy and ourselves, the study of using existing equipment to fight a modern war is the general topic of our training reform. In the over 30-week discussion of "how training can meet the demands of modernized warfare," many of the questions raised and many of the opinions expressed have centered on this general topic. Some comrades worry: Can we, with the existing inferior equipment, defeat an enemy who has superior equipment? With the existing weapons can we train in the skills of modern war? We think that a conscientious look back at the history of our army's armed

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struggle over several decades and a review of the guidance of the great teacher of the revolution when he said that the decisive factor for victory or defeat in war is man not weapons, and a careful analysis of our existing military level with regard to the suitability of weaponry and equipment, should give us the correct answer. When we speak of fighting a modern war with an enemy, we are certainly not solely indicating a test of strength between modernized weapons, but are indicating that people's subjective activity will be brought into full play to find methods of using inferior equipment to defeat an enemy with superior equipment. One should see that when we say our weaponry and equipment are backward, we are comparing them with those of the principal enemy, and this definitely does not mean our army's existing equipment is completely backward without a single redeeming feature. That would not jibe with reality. In fact, our army has now been developed into a combined arms force with atomic bombs and guided missiles. It must also be recognized that the existing equipment is not being used so as to bring out its greatest efficacy. The current problem is not completely that the same equipment is comparatively obsolete and backward, but in many aspects people's level is not suitable for the existing equipment. Only if we reform training well, accelerate the raising of people's tactical and technological levels, fully display the might of existing equipment, apply the strategy and tactics of people's war, make the most of our strengths and attack the enemy's weaknesses, can we have full confidence in obtaining victory in a future war against aggression.

In emancipating the mind and reforming training, we must enthusiastically support new things that emerge during the reform and correctly deal with problems encountered on our advance. Some comrades worry that mistakes will be made in the reform, disorder will be created, and things will be done poorly. Full misgivings, they wait for "readymade food" and ignore the creative spirit of the masses in the reform. Obviously, this attitude is incorrect. Training reform is a new problem for which we lack wide experience. We urge the masses to be bold in practice and courageously blaze new trails. In the process of the reform, the emergence of this or that mistake, setback, or failure is nothing to make a big fuss about. What is so terrible about making a mistake? Sum up experiences and try it again! Naturally, by saying not to be afraid of setbacks we are not advocating disorder, by advocating boldness in practice we are not encouraging foolhardiness. Revolutionary zeal and scientific attitude must be combined. For some major reforms there must first be a "scientific experiment" at one point, and after passing through the test of practice, it will be decided whether to accept or reject the reform, and if it is accepted it will spread over a whole area from one point.

Emancipating the mind and reforming training demands that we strengthen study. No reform can depart from science, and if there is no real ability and learning the so-called emancipation of the mind very possibly will lead to wild flights of fancy. It is unimaginable that a person who knows nothing about military theory, who is utterly ignorant of the reality of military operations and training, and also is afraid of using his brains and is unwilling to learn, can have much real knowledge and deep insight with regard to reforming training. The present situation is that there are really a considerable number of comrades who have little talent and less learning and whose ability to shoulder responsibilities is weak. Only by rapidly changing this state of affairs can there truly be results in training reform. We hope that every comrade, especially the leading comrades, will conscientiously think: In the final analysis, how much do I understand about the military

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theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought? In the final analysis how much have I studied the characteristics and laws of modern warfare? In the final analysis, how well do I comprehend the practice of troop training? The circumstances in which the modernization of the armed forces is going ahead at full speed compel us to think and learn, and the prospect of a future war forces us to think and learn. Our jobs cannot give us wisdom. Only by arduous study, learning from books, from reality, from the masses and also from the enemy can we obtain the right to speak about and the right to lead the training reform, and can we guide the masses, be bold in practice, and continually push forward the training reform.

9727

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## MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

## COMMUNICATIONS PLAY VITAL ROLE IN MODERN WARFARE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 17 Sep 79 p 2

[Article compiled by Tong Xinchu [4547 0207 2806] and Hong Xin [3163 0207]: "On What Does a Massive Army Rely on To Stay in Contact--Compilation of Statements at an Experience-Exchange Meeting of Signalmen Who Had Taken Part in the War"]

[Text] Fighting a War Depends on Command, Command Depends on Communications

Deputy political commissar Yang Jian'an [2799 1696 1344] of a certain artillery regiment: Having gone through this war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam, the commanders of our regiment personally experienced the status and effect of maintaining contact and combining forces. Signal communications are the nerve system of the armed forces and the basic measure for insuring operational command. If the hub of this nerve system is paralyzed, then half of the armed forces' body will be paralyzed, and how could a war be fought! In this war we put communications work in its proper place and strengthen concrete leadership over this work. Therefore, under the conditions in which command posts at all levels were shifted over 30 times, we were able to maintain smooth communications and this played an important role in our being victorious in battle.

Communications section chief Zhang Guoxin [1728 0948 0207]: A unit must be dispersed and also drawn together, and the commander must get a tight grip on communications. A certain regiment of our unit received the mission of using its deep-thrust force to tear open a hole in the enemy line. The regiment, spread out over a 5-kilometer front, by the use of concealed communications methods was united into one body. The soldiers swiftly and violently engaged the enemy and rapidly stormed and captured the enemy's main forward position. After completely annihilating the enemy, at one command they immediately drew together. What was the main reason that the soldiers dispersed so swiftly and drew together so well in this battle? Regimental command Zhang Zhi'an [1728 1807 1344] gave this answer: "Fighting a war depends on command, and command depends on communications. If communications are effective, troops can be combined to win a victory; if communications are not effective, then even with the best resolution, things cannot be carried out."

Communications subsection chief Liu Zhize [0491 1807 3419]: Precisely because communications are important, the commanders of combined arms forces pay the fullest attention to communications work. Zhang Wanman [1728 8001 1628], the commander of our division, made signal communications an important duty of his own self and of commanders at all levels in the division in organizational and operational command. Before battle, he suggested that communications section chiefs be invited

13  
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to take part in the party committee meeting so that they would understand the intent and plan for the operation, listen to the report from the communications departments, examine and revise the plan for insuring operational communications, and check up on the implementation of preparatory work. He also, with the communications personnel, devised 28 radio signals for the hidden command of the deep-thrust forces, and personally mastered the methods of using them. On 9 March, taking advantage of our withdrawal, the enemy attempted to cross the (Qi Qiong) River and wait for a chance to make a surprise attack on Hill 390, which was being held by one of our companies. Division commander Zhang immediately saw through the enemy's plot, and before the attack ordered the regimental chief of staff to see that a telephone line was connected to Hill 390 and also put in an additional walkie-talkie. When the sounds of battle began, division commander Zhang kept watch beside the telephone and directed the company in the battle. In a 1-day fierce battle, 177 enemy soldiers were wiped out. In the violent attack on (Zhi Ma), the capture of (Lu Ping), the storming and capture of (Mi Mai Shan), and the attack on the pursuing enemy--in all these battles, the signal communications were swift, accurate, secure, and uninterrupted so that in the four battles the division was victorious.

Communications section chief Zhu Shilin [2612 0099 2651]: From this war we see that a few commanders still have an inadequate understanding of the importance of signal communications and still do not correctly use communications instruments. Some are accustomed to bugles, barners, and signal flares and cannot use modern communications methods; some care only about getting their messages through and do not observe security measures so that they reveal their units' line of march and its operational intent; and some only grasp the "wired" and not the "wireless," thinking that wired telephones are safe and radios are dangerous, so that they think of the wireless but fear to use it. A commander of a certain regiment followed the forces that made a deep thrust into the heart of the enemy's area, and when closing with the enemy he maintained radio silence in order to conceal his intent. But when fire began to be exchanged, the divisional command radio station tried to call him and the commander, who had previously answered according to prescribed procedures, would not answer, so that the upper level for as long as 8 hours did not know the situation of the deep-thrust force and had no way to correctly command it.

## Technology Equals Highly Effective Liaison

"Heroic communications platoon" leader Chen Zhenye [7115 6966 0673]: Courage is the ideological basis for completing a mission, and technology is the material insurance for completing a mission. By the addition of technology, a unit's combat effectiveness can be brought out. The large number of heroic signalmen that emerged during this war were both brave, fearless fighters and technically proficient crack troops, and they made a great contribution to battle victories. "Heroic signalman" Yang Chunhua [2799 2504 5478], wounded in five places on his body and with his uniform stained red with blood, still skillfully operated his machine and maintained uninterrupted contact from beginning to end. "Model handie-talkie operator" Chang Chaomiao [1603 6389 3267], with three bullets in his body, staunchly kept on working for 2.5 hours, guiding artillery fire that destroyed eight enemy firing points in succession. After he had sacrificed his life, his hand still touched his traneiver and his right hand tightly held its microphone next to his mouth. Our platoon was in the battle that surrounded and annihilated

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the enemy at (Shuo Jiang), and to be able to satisfactorily complete its mission it relied on combining courage with technique. Even if at that time our casualties were fairly heavy, no sooner had one comrade in the platoon fallen than another stepped into the breach without fear of the ultimate sacrifice. The eight walkie-talkies kept working from first to last without stopping, and while on foot the signalmen transmitted over 300 battle orders. Practice in battle clearly shows that there is no question of the courage of the great number of our signalmen, and with the addition of technology they can surmount every difficulty and guarantee unimpeded communication.

Communications section chief Wang [character illegible] [3769 ]: War is the best test of the peacetime technological level of us communications personnel. If our peacetime technology is meticulous, then in wartime we can be proficient. This war once again proves that if there is strict training before a war and one becomes skilled in the techniques of one's profession, then in war, no matter how complicated the situation, one can be equal to the occasion and insure good communications. With regard to our unit, the technological backbone contingent that took part in the war fully displayed its technological might in battle. The great majority of the comrades rendered meritorious service in the war. Many antijamming experts, rapid receiver-dispatchers, and other technological aces distinguished themselves in battle and did not let any difficulties, no matter how big, deter them. Radio operator Cheng Guanyan [4453 6034 3508] in peacetime was a model soldier in rapidly linking up communications. In one battle, after he had received the order to turn on his radio, he was responsible for 7 communications targets and in only 8 minutes he had linked up with all of them. Many handie-talkie operators memorized by heart the encrypting code and worked side by side with the commanders, rapidly encrypting and transmitting their messages, reporting to higher levels and transmitting to lower levels, and immediately sending battle orders. However, there were also mistakes in copying and receiving messages, e.g., changing "storm and capture" to "defend tenaciously," which caused the troops to suffer unnecessary casualties. This shows that in modern warfare if there is no specialized technological contingent that has been well trained in peacetime, then it will be impossible to completely fulfill the signal communications mission.

"Heroic telephone exchange squad" leader Zhang Yan [1728 1484]: By combining courage with technology, the role of existing equipment can be brought into full play and the effectiveness of signal communications can be continually heightened. On 2 March, at a critical moment in the attack on the district town of (Sha Ba), the oscillator on the generator of our telephone exchange suddenly broke down and there was no replacement. Deputy squad leader Ji Li [0679 5461] suddenly hit upon a way out of this predicament. Together with telephone operator Long Qun [7893 5028], she quickly replaced the telephone exchange's generator with a simple generator and in only 25 seconds restored the telephone exchange to normal working order. Throughout the entire battle, every member of our squad applied the 18 skills learned in peacetime, displaying enthusiasm and initiative so that one person did the work of several. The squad opened 11 telephone centers, set up 31.5 kilometers of telephone line, with 155 telephone users, and connected 14,666 calls without any errors, thereby insuring the operational command. After the war the squad received a collective citation, first class, for meritorious service.

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## Adapting to Three-Dimensional Warfare, Coordinating Communications Well

Communications section chief Su Diancheng [5685 3013 2052]: This war was a realistic test for insuring the coordination of communications between infantry, artillery, tank, and all service arms during joint operations. In general, the coordination of communications between infantry and tanks revealed quite a number of problems. During the battle in which (Fu He) was attacked, because communications were not coordinated close enough the communications medium was fragile. After the coordinating transmitter-receiver was destroyed, the commander could not direct his tanks. The communications subsection chief could only use semaphore signals, but these did not make contact with the tanks. The tanks did not know our infantry's position and the infantry did not recognize their own tanks, with the result that accidental casualties were caused to our side. Infantry-artillery communications were coordinated fairly well. When our unit was attacking (Kou Ma Shan), the natural defense barrier to Lang Son, communications between the infantry and artillery were coordinated smoothly, thereby insuring that artillery fire crept forward progressively, paving the way for the infantry assault, and the infantry successfully stormed and captured (Kou Ma Shan). During the battle in which the (Tong Deng) and Lang Son area was attacked, several hundred large-caliber artillery pieces organized four 25-minute barrages at over 100 targets. In every barrage, all artillery pieces, on command, started and stopped firing in unison. The infantrymen universally reported that the artillery fire did whatever was asked of it, coming when called and being accurate and fierce. It was if the artillery shells had "eyes."

Communications subsection chief Li Zhenren [2621 2182 0088]: In this war, the air force did not directly coordinate its operations with the ground forces, but, with regard to the organizational preparation for air-ground coordinated communications, there are still many problems. Some of the prescribed methods of distinguishing air and ground forces are basically awkward methods of coordination devised in the 1930's and 1940's for propeller aircraft. Owing to the effects of terrain and weather, there is no way of insuring that the air and ground forces distinguish each other and of calling in attack planes to hit targets for us, so that there is a great possibility of accidental casualties occurring in wartime. Modern warfare is three-dimensional, and it requires cohesion and liaison. One of its aspects is that a combined arms commander must be an expert in commanding joint operations by all service arms, and at the same time must have advanced methods of communication so as to insure close coordination between the service arms. Thinking of the present fight against the "wolf" to the future fight against the "bear," we must intensify the development of advanced electronics communications equipment for the purpose of coordination, and also as rapidly as possible rationally work out the establishment and system of the equipment used by signalmen for coordination. In the unit's education and training from now on, we must strengthen the study and practice drills in coordinating communications between the service arms, especially between infantry and tanks and between ground and air forces, and rapidly improve their capacity to insure coordinated communications.

## Have Movement in Mind, Base Oneself on Change

Communications section chief Sun Zhengqian [1327 2973 0578]: In modern warfare, the situation on the battlefield is ever-changing and the fighting between us and the enemy is intricate and complex. Only by keeping in mind movement and basing

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oneself on change can one be prepared for any eventuality and insure uninterrupted signal communications. For the mobile battle mission to which we were assigned this time, the direction and area of operation were not fixed and we fought wherever we were required to fight. The operations were very fluid and we frequently fought in one place after another. How were we to adapt signal communications to these features of movement and change? Our main methods were:

1. We formulated preliminary plans and made early preparations. After being ordered to take part in the war, we immediately convened a meeting of subsection and unit chiefs at which the directives from the higher-level commanders and the communications departments were relayed, the mission was clarified, and all sorts of preliminary plans were made to insure communications, so that the communications departments at all levels could make early preparations, gain time, and seize the initiative.

2. Focusing on characteristics, we made full preparation. From the time we entered the assembly area until we went into battle, based on the commander's operational plan, we envisaged all sorts of complicated situations. For example, how to insure communications for a large unit that makes a long-distance deep thrust that splits the enemy; how to organize liaison with a small unit that moves by many routes; how to handle the situation when a road is too narrow, or has been destroyed by the enemy, so that communications vehicles cannot use it; and how to take remedial measures when the communications personnel have been made casualties or their equipment has been destroyed, etc. We repeatedly analyzed and studied all these problems and came up with the corresponding measures to solve them. Thus, careful thought before battle led to good communications during battle. After the troops went into battle, no matter how the situation changed and how complicated the environment became, signal communications were maintained uninterrupted from beginning to end.

3. We gave priority to radio communications and put many hands to work on preparations for it. The communications methods we employed, in alternation, were wired, wireless, and courier-relay. During a battle, if wired communication couldn't get through, wireless communication was used; if the radio transmitter-receiver couldn't get through, courier-relay communication was used; if direct means of communication couldn't get through indirect means were used.

Communications section chief Li Kewan [2621 0344 2429]: Having movement in mind and basing oneself on change demands that our communications departments and communications personnel display their subjective activity; be tireless in running around and in using their eyes, mouths, and minds; immediately grasp situations; and improve their capacity to meet all sorts of emergencies. To meet this demand, it is very important: to take the initiative to inform the commander about signal communications and, immediately upon obtaining the commander's instructions; to regularly go to the operations room to keep abreast of the progress of the battle in order to immediately take measures and continually check up on the organization of signal communications; and to make sure that the higher and lower levels keep in touch and exchange reports on the situation. If the communications departments in good time grasp the developments and changes in the process of a battle, then signal communications will be able to adapt to change without confusion and to movement without being disrupted.

9727

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DEFENSE MINISTER ON IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MILITARY THEORY

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Dec 80 p 2

[Article: "Arm the Minds of Commanders With Advanced Military Theory--Comrade Xu Xiangqian's Answers to Questions Put by the Editorial Department of MILITARY SCIENCE"]

[Text] Editor's note: Military theory, which has its origin in practice and which also plays a guiding role in the practice of warfare, is a powerful weapon in studying warfare and its guiding laws. In order to improve the quality of education and training so as to vanquish the enemy in a future war, and to make solid, steady progress in the modernization of the armed forces, we must not for a single moment separate ourselves from the scientific guidance of military theory. In particular, under the conditions in which the object of our military operations has changed and in which the enemy's weaponry and equipment are superior to ours, we must as swiftly as possible study and train in a set of tactics that will enable an inferior force to defeat a superior force. The study of military theory is thus even more urgent, even more important. This conversation between Comrade Xu Xiangqian [minister of national defense] and the editorial department of MILITARY SCIENCE is rich in content and earnest. Its fundamental spirit is that we must make a painstaking effort to master military theory and to arm our minds with advanced military theory. The completion of this study task is a matter of great urgency, but it cannot be done overnight and it requires painstaking effort. At the beginning of the new year, our cadres, especially those at the upper and middle levels, should have this aspiration: raise their own military level a notch so as to meet the requirements of modern warfare.

We Must See the Importance of Military Theory

Question: First, please tell us: What is the major significance of research work in military science with regard to the modernization of national defense?

Answer: This question must be discussed theoretically, but it is not good to discuss it in general terms. There are no more than three aspects to modernization of the armed forces: first is weaponry and equipment, and this is the material

foundation; second is the people who skillfully master modernized weaponry, equipment, and operational methods, particularly the cadres; and third is the integration of people with weapons, and for this there must be a scientific military establishment and system. The people I am talking about here are a very important condition for realizing the modernization of the armed forces. Sun Zi said, "The general who understands war is the minister of the people's fate" in reference to the importance of the commander. Only if the commander understands the characteristics, strategy and tactics of modern warfare will he be able to better develop the role of the other two aspects and form a powerful fighting force.

Research in military science is the work of studying the laws of warfare and of inquiring into military theory. Engels said: "The revolution will use modern military measures and modern military science to fight modern military measures and modern military science." To modernize national defense, we must not only develop advanced military science and improve our weaponry and equipment, but also make a great effort to study modern military science. These two aspects complement each other. We cannot just see the importance of weaponry and equipment and not see the importance of military theory. If we master and apply advanced military theory, even if our weaponry and equipment are inferior we can vanquish an enemy who has superior weaponry and equipment. Without the correct guidance of military theory, in wartime battles will be fought in a messy fashion and in peacetime the quality of the troops' education and training will not improve, the development of weaponry and equipment will be sidetracked, and a powerful fighting force will not be built. Our armed forces are good armed forces with a glorious history and a wealth of combat experience. This must be affirmed. However, it will not do to just brag about the past, and it is insufficient to rely only on the experience of fighting past wars. Once weapons change, tactics inevitably change. There is a great difference in the tactics of the bow and arrow, sword and spear "cold weapons" era and the tactics of the rifle and machinegun era. And there was also a big change in the tactics of World War II as compared to those of World War I. It will not do to use old things to deal with new things. The army of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom won many victories over the Qing dynasty army, but it was defeated when it encountered the "foreign gun corps." At the beginning of World War II, the Soviet Union had the worst of it from Hitler's blitzkrieg. How will World War III be fought? How can Soviet aggression be dealt with? It can be affirmed that there will be many new characteristics and new problems. In war under modern conditions, equipment is complex, logistics are complex, and command is very complex. This requires that we engage in painstaking study. Our armed forces had been at war for 22 years in the past, and during the war periods, although a few military schools were run, a little training was done, and some strategies and tactics were taught, this was quite inadequate. Therefore, generally speaking, the level of our commanders' military theory was not high. After the founding of the state, many military schools were run, and with great success, but then there were two big setbacks: one was the setback caused by opposition to standardization, and the other was the setback caused by opposition to "dogmatism." The harm to our army's modernization done by Lin Biao and the "gang of four" was even greater. We now must meet the situation head'on and catch up, i.e., we must grasp the study and learning of military theory and arm our commanders' minds with military theory.

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## Military Science Must Study the Enemy and Ourselves

Question: What is the focal point of the research work in military science?

Answer: There are many questions that military science must study. To put it briefly, it is the study of the enemy and ourselves. We must penetratingly study the principal object of a future war. How will the enemy fight? In the air he has a large number of aircraft, and on the ground he has thousands of tanks and armored vehicles as well as powerful artillery and guided missile forces. He also has a navy that can come from the sea, and he can even use thermonuclear weapons. How should we fight this kind of enemy? Sun Zi said: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." How can you fight if you don't know the enemy's situation? When we fought against Chiang Kai-shek, we were very clear about his situation and he was not clear about our situation, so that we held the initiative. The study of the principal object of a future war must not just be of his military aspect; his political and economic aspects must both be studied. Militarily, we must study his establishment and equipment, strategy and tactics, and command characteristics; must study the past war experiences, history of war, specific examples of battle, and all sorts of organized maneuvers; and also must study the articles in publications. From all of this we can see his military thought, can see how he prepares for war. We must study how others control their military forces and how they conduct training. As much as possible we should spread widely military data on the Soviet Union and other countries, and we must not seal ourselves off.

We must also make a very good study of ourselves. In studying our army's past experience, the main thing is to study the experience of how, with inferior equipment, we vanquished an enemy with superior equipment, and, based on the new situation, develop the experience further and seek ways to deal with the enemy. Comparing modern warfare with past warfare, no matter what the object of the war or the scale of the war, there will be many methods of war we have never encountered. If we use old standards to deal with and guide modern warfare, then we will run into big snags and suffer a lot. During World War II, some countries stayed in a rut, remained in the World War I period, and made serious mistakes in directing the war. We should learn a lesson from this. In studying past experiences, we cannot remain at the level of principles. For example, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" is a fundamental principle, but it will not do to only understand this fundamental principle. Under specific conditions, the application of principles are different. We certainly must learn, based on the situation, to flexibly use principles, develop principles, and originate new principles.

## Military History Is a Science

Question: Many countries are now paying a great deal of attention to the study of military history. How should we understand the importance of studying military history?

Answer: The study of military history is very important. I have said in the past that our military academies must teach the history of wars, including the history of ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign wars. Military history is a science.

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Studying military history means to study the laws of warfare from the practice of past wars. "History is a mirror." By mastering military history, we can better draw on the war experiences of the ancients and the contemporaries. In studying a future war against aggression, we can seek some laws from the history of past wars, especially the history of World War II. Our war of resistance against Japan was a protracted war in three stages: defense, stalemate, and counterattack. In the Soviet-German war, there were also for the Soviet Union the stages of defense (or withdrawal), stalemate, and counterattack, but the period of stalemate was not as long as ours. What kind of war will be our future one against aggression? In my view, to counter, with inferior equipment, an enemy with superior equipment, we must still fight a people's war, must still, adopting a strategic policy of active defense, fight a protracted war. Many books are now being published that relate to the study of World War II: Zukhov's "Memoirs and Reflections," Vasilevskiy's "A Graduate's Cause," and Shtmenko's "Soviet General Staff at War." America, England, and Japan also have many books on the study of World War II. It is very essential for our commanders to read some of these books. And in particular they must read books concerning the Soviet-German battlefield problems during World War II.

Having fought wars for so many years, we have rich experience. We should learn from and study well Comrade Mao Zedong's military writings, which generalized our experience to a high degree. However, this is not enough. There are many concrete experiences that have not been well and systematically summed up. Our period of guerrilla war was the largest and its scale the largest, and we should say that its experience was the richest. Comrades in foreign countries once wanted experience in this aspect, and we certainly will not take out systematic things. Besides Comrade Mao Zedong's military writings, there are many military treatises written by comrades of the older generation. For example, there are many military writings by Comrade Liu Bochong, a famous strategist and military theorist. These people all reflect our army's experiences, and there are very incisive and original passages in their writings that are our army's precious wealth and that we should compile, study, and learn from.

## Cadres Must Read Many Military Treatises

Question: Please tell us: what basic conditions and basic knowledge should a competent commander possess?

Answer: Some comrades say that economic work cannot be pushed forward unless attention is paid to fostering talented persons. In my view, military work also cannot be pushed forward unless attention is paid to fostering talented persons. At present the level of military theory of many cadres in our army, their level of organizational command and management, as well as their level of scientific education, still cannot meet the demands of modern warfare. This is a very big problem that must be solved. Besides possessing the necessary political qualifications, a competent commander must certainly study in a painstaking fashion modern military theory, and he must possess a fixed amount of knowledge about military history and a fixed amount of knowledge about science and technology. The basic method of training cadres is to let them study. It is important to run schools well and to provide good rotational training. At the same time, we must pay attention to people developing themselves by self-study. Soldiers must be trained, trained, trained; cadres must read more books. We must begin by enriching the knowledge of the fighters and



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the low-level cadres. They are the basic level, and all cadres will proceed from the basic level. On this basis, their gradual pursuit of advanced studies will be made easy. Generally speaking, cadres at the regimental level and above should have comparatively rich knowledge about military affairs and other things. To illustrate with examples, in Chinese history there are many military treatises: "Sun Zi's Art of War: is world famous; "Wu Zi ["The Art of War of Wu Qi"], "The Art of War of Sima Rangjiu," "The Six Arts of War," "The Three Strategies," "The Dialogue Between Dukes Li and Wei," etc. Many celebrated battles should also be studied. At present, the knowledge of this aspect on the part of some of our cadres is too small, and it is possible that some of them cannot name some of the dynasties in Chinese history. Since ancient times, China has produced some military figures, as have foreign countries. Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Suvorov all had some special traits which the cadres should know about. If a military commander is too lacking in historical knowledge, he will be severely handicapped. It was said in ancient times: "Only if one is wise can one be full of stratagems" and "A general who does not know about both ancient and modern times will be foolhardy." These propositions are certainly true.

We must pay full attention to fostering middle-aged and young cadres. Many of the articles in foreign military publications that I have seen were written by field-grade officers. In the future, wars will mainly be fought by our middle-aged and young comrades, and our state and armed forces place their hopes on them. They must be cherished and encouraged. The middle-aged and young cadres must understand their own responsibilities and know how valuable time is. In my understanding, the time when the thirst for knowledge is the keenest is the age between the early 20's up to 30. People in this age group want to read, read quickly, and have a strong memory; those who are older have some deficiencies in this respect. Therefore, they must make the best use of this time to study. Many of our middle-aged and young cadres are outstanding and use their brains a lot; it is only that their experience is somewhat insufficient. Running well military publications is a very important measure for fostering and improving the cadres.

Question: What instructions do you have for running military publications well?

Answer: In running publications, their object must be considered. Cadres of our armed forces are divided into initial level, middle level, and higher level. Are not publications required to divide their work according to cadre levels? How are they to be divided? This is worthy of study. I feel that we want military publications suitable to be read by lower-level cadres, and they should mainly be devoted to tactics, command, military history, and technology. The educational level of fighters in companies is now much higher than it was in the past, and we should publish more reading materials that are suitable for these fighters to read, i.e., military, political, natural science, reading materials, etc, and we can compile some more booklets. The militia should also have military publications, principally devoted to military knowledge. I think that to disseminate military knowledge throughout the army and country is a very important problem. This must always be done, and if it is not done today then it must be done tomorrow, if it is not done now then it must be done in the future.

These views of mine are very superficial, and what I have said is provided for your reference and for discussion by everybody.

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9727

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROBATIONARY PARTY MEMBERS MUST BE GIVEN TIMELY CONSIDERATION

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by the Party Work Office of the General Political Organization Department:  
"The Question of Probationary Party Members Becoming Full Party Members Should Be  
Timely Discussed"]

[Text] Comrade editor:

The party constitution stipulates: "When the probationary period of a probationary party member has expired, the party branch should timely discuss whether he is to become a full party member. If he is qualified for full party membership, he should become a full party member on schedule; if further investigation is required, his probationary period can be extended." However, in the party organizations of some units, the branch does not timely discuss whether probationary party members whose probationary period has expired are to become full party members, and the party committee does not timely give an official written reply to its subordinate body, so that the process is slowed and the probationary period for party members is covertly extended. We think party organizations at all levels ought to handle this matter strictly according to the party constitution and timely discuss the question of probationary party members becoming full party members.

Zhang Yifei [1728 0001 7378], Political Department, Unit 37002

Comrade Zhang Yifei:

JIEFANGJUN BAO has passed your letter on to us. At the same time, we have also received some letters of similar nature, reporting that in some units the party organizations cannot discuss the question of probationary party members becoming full members. We think this question should draw the serious attention of party organizations at all levels and that they should redress this situation.

According to the reports, there are many reasons for the inability to timely discuss the question of probationary party members becoming full members. In some units, there is insufficient attention paid to the matter and it is not tightly grasped; in some units because a probationary party member is still not qualified to be a full member, the party organization cannot stick to principle, and it fears that a formal announcement of an extension of the probationary period would make the work diffi-

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cult; and other units, in order to prevent the probationary party members among the fighters from not keeping their minds on active service, use the method of putting off the discussion so as to "block" them, or on the pretext of making more "tests" take another "look" so that they do not become full members on schedule, etc.

We think these ways of doing things are incorrect. The party constitution stipulates: "The probationary period of a party is 1 year" and "When the probationary period of a probationary party members has expired, the party branch should timely discuss whether he can become a full member." Before a probationary party members enters the party, he is investigated and educated by the party organization. After entering the party, he passes through a 1-year probationary period of investigation and finding out about him. If his motive in entering the party, his ideological character, his degree of awareness, his organizational discipline, and his fulfillment of his duties as a party member are all comparatively clear, then the party branch should, based on what it has investigated and found out about him, discuss whether he has the qualifications to become a full member, and decide either to promote him to full member on schedule or to extend his probationary period or to cancel his qualifications as a probationary party member, and moreover to report the decision to the higher-level party committee for its approval.

The timely discussion of the question of a probationary party member becoming a full member is an important content in the work of developing the party, and is also an expression of responsibility toward the comrades and a responsibility of the party organizations. When a comrade becomes a probationary party member, the party organization's work of receiving the party member is not finished, and it must continue to investigate and educate him, helping him to become a qualified full member and discussing the question of his being promoted to full member. This is precisely the summation of this investigation and education. To timely promote to full members qualified probationary party members, adding new strength to the party ranks, is also an encouragement for these people; with regard to a probationary party member who is temporarily not qualified to be a full member and whose probationary period is extended, to point out his currently existing shortcomings and in what direction he should make efforts in the future is a responsibility toward the comrade; to cancel the qualifications of probationary party members who are truly not qualified to be full members, thus preventing some persons from entering the party whose motive is not pure and who will not play the role of party members is the responsibility of the party organizations. To handle probationary party members by the method of delaying the discussion of their becoming full members so as to "block" them is not a correct attitude. This is because it not only does not achieve the goal of education, but also could easily cause the probationary party members to be at a loss what to do, and even produce improper ideological problems. We certainly must handle this matter according to the provisions of the party constitution, and not only must the basic-level party branches timely discuss it, but also the higher level party committees must timely examine and approve the decision regarding the question of probationary party members becoming full members.

Obviously, when we speak of "timely" we definitely are not saying that it must be done overnight and that we must not delay the process under ordinary conditions. If the probationary period of some probationary party members has expired, but some problems are discovered that need to be examined or are awaiting clarification by discussion at party branch meetings on probationary party members becoming full members, then a delay of the discussion is necessary and permissible, but this should

be explained to all members of the party branch and to the persons concerned. Similarly, if the probationary period for a probationary party member has not expired, for a party organization to handle the procedures for making him a full member in advance of this expiration is also incorrect.

9727

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MEDIC DOES GOOD WORK IN BORDER DEFENSE UNIT

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 31 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Chen Deng [7115 6772] et al.: "He Is an Ordinary Medical Orderly"]

[Text] "He is a university graduate who has done quite well in border defense." This is how the cadres and fighters of a certain medical unit of the border defense forces have praised medical orderly Zhang Xiangguang [1728 4382 0342].

In January 19-9, Zhang Xiangguang graduated from Guilin Medical School. Just when he was waiting for an assignment from the state, the guns of the war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam sounded, and he was assigned as a medical orderly in a certain regiment of the border defense forces. Like the silent burning of a piece of shiny black coal, from that time on he only hoped to give his "heat" to the people and he never pursued the glamor of an individual. The medical unit and a commune hospital had the joint use of an X-ray machine, but there was no one to operate it. On his own initiative, he took charge of the fluoroscopy work for patients. From then on, it was unnecessary for patients to go to the county seat, over 60 li away, for fluorscopy. In March of this year, in order to display Zhang Xiangguang's technical skill, the leadership transfered him to outpatient service work. In the unit, the doctors every day took shifts in turn according to regulations, but, in ordinary circumstances, Zhang Xiangguang almost never left his post. In one period of time, he was the only person left in the outpatient treatment room. Every day he would diagnose and treat patients on more than 50 occasions, but he still zealously and conscientiously received patients and was not careless. In order to let other comrades see motion pictures, he frequently on his own initiative took their shifts. Observing his selfless work, people urged him to take a rest. But he said, "Everywhere there are border defense fighters. What does this amount to!"

9727

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PLA UNIT INFORMATION, DESIGNATIONS

[The following PLA unit number and information are taken from various issues of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to date of newspaper report.]

- Unit 00425--A technician of the 16th Zhongdui of this unit developed a transistorized electromagnetic plunger pump as a substitute for the TCB-22 electric-powered oil pump. (12 Jun 79 p 3)
- Unit 00934--This unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 1)
- Unit 32114--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)
- Unit 32347--The 24th Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (27 Jun 79 p 4)
- Unit 32360--A reconnaissance company of this unit is mentioned. (3 Jun 79 p 3)
- Unit 32383--This unit is identified. (8 Feb 81 p 2)
- Unit 32846--The 3rd Company of this unit is mentioned. (13 Jun 79 p 1)
- Unit 33630--This unit is mentioned. (15 Jun 79 p 2)
- Unit 33656--The 9th Company of this unit improved training in night tactical maneuvers against an enemy well equipped with night vision equipment. (30 Aug 79 p 2)
- Unit 33984--The 1st Battalion of this unit is engaged in tree-planting activities. (14 Feb 81 p 1)
- Unit 34116--Commanders and fighters of the 4th Company of this unit take the heroes of the self-defense counterattack war as examples and rigorously carry out training in tactical maneuvers under various kinds of complex conditions. (11 Jun 79 p 1)
- Unit 34318--The 2nd Company of this unit is training with various types of weapons to become a force with many capabilities. (30 Jun 79 p 1)

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Unit 34624--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 36111--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 37002--Zhu Tingyu [2612 1656 0151] is identified as a machine gun and artillery squad leader of Ship 2304. (2 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 37041--This unit is identified. (20 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 37614--The 52nd Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (9 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 39356--This unit is mentioned. (3 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 39782--This unit and the Guangzhou Units Air Force Scientific Research Section together developed a light to guide aircraft landing in adverse weather conditions. (12 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 39791--This unit developed a device to check the sealing of an aircraft engine's accelerator system. (12 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 51011--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 51015--This unit is identified. (27 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 51029--Based on the likelihood that enemy troops will deploy nuclear, chemical and biological warfare weapons in a modern war, a signal company of this unit combined specialized training with the "three defense" training. (9 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 51035--Compared to the same period last year, this unit reduced its training expenses by 15 percent. (11 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 51038--A tank regiment is mentioned. (1 Jun 79 p 2)

--A special task company of this unit is mentioned. (2 Jul 79 p 4)

Unit 51046--This unit is mentioned. (14 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 51047--The 1st Machine Gun Company of this unit is identified. (20 Feb 81 p 2)

Unit 51124--The 93rd Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (27 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 51135--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 51272--The 69th Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (9 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 52830--This unit is mentioned. (2 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 52839--A member of this unit wrote an article on learning from the revolutionary spirit of Zhang Zhixin. (15 Jun 79 p 2)

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Unit 52841--The 2nd Company of this unit carried out night tactical training.  
(30 Aug 79 p 2)

Unit 52849--This unit is mentioned. (4 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 52876--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 52885--A repair company of this unit is mentioned. (1 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 52891--This unit is mentioned. (4 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 52924--The 3rd Company of this unit is mentioned. (22 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 52934--The headquarters of this unit made certain that funds allocated for training are used for that purpose and not wasted on something else.  
(11 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 52985--Lin Zongling [0690 1350 1545] is identified as the deputy commander of this unit. (5 Jul 79 p 3)

Unit 53010--This unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 1)

Unit 53014--An artillery company of the 2nd Battalion of this unit is mentioned.  
(4 Mar 81 p 1)

--The 1st Company of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53019--This unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 4)

Unit 53026--The 1st Machine Gun Company of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 1)

Unit 53205--This unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53207--This unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53209--A motor vehicle company of this unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 1)

Unit 53211--This unit is engaged in training cadres for combat rescue using army horses. (11 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53215--The 2nd Battalion of this unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53504--The 2nd Machine Gun Company and the 2nd Artillery Company of this unit are mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53505--The 8th Company of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 3)

Unit 53507--A reconnaissance squad of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 2)

Unit 53509--The 1st Machine Gun Company of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 3)



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- Unit 53511--The 3rd Battalion of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 3)
- Unit 53714--This unit is identified. (10 Feb 81 p 1)
- Unit 53803--A command company of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 1)
- Unit 53804--This unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 3)
- Unit 53805--This unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 3)
- Unit 54106--The 11th Company of this unit is placing emphasis on training in command skills. (30 Jun 79 p 1)
- Unit 54116--A machine gun and artillery company of this unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 2)
- Unit 54251--This unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 3)
- Unit 54258--The 7th Company of this unit is mentioned. (11 Mar 81 p 3)
- Unit 54259--The 3rd Battalion of this unit is mentioned. (4 Mar 81 p 1)
- Unit 54746--The party committee of an unidentified regiment uses itself as an example to prevent a loss of interest from developing in the study of sciences. (27 Jun 79 p 2)
- Unit 54825--This unit is mentioned. (10 Jun 79 p 3)
- Unit 55113--The 2nd Company of this unit is identified. (6 Feb 81 p 2)
- Unit 57659--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)
- Unit 59322--This unit is mentioned. (12 Jun 79 p 4)
- Unit 81021--The headquarters of this unit set up a training squad which has successfully economized on training expenditures. (11 Jun 79 p 1)
- Unit 81054--The head of a radio company relay station of this unit developed a small antenna for the type 63A relay device. (12 Jun 79 p 2)
- Unit 81217--The 1st Company of this unit is mentioned. (2 Jul 79 p 4)
- Unit 81248--A crack artillery squad of this unit takes the self-defense counter-attack war as an example and rigorously trains in antitank skills with 82mm recoilless guns. (21 Jun 79 p 2)
- Unit 81257--The 2nd Artillery Company of this unit is mentioned. (27 Jun 79 p 4)
- Unit 81362--This unit is mentioned. (4 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 81544--This unit is mentioned. (10 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 81881--This unit is identified. (18 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83013--This unit is mentioned. (7 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83024--Cadres and fighters of this unit took part in tree-planting activities. (14 Feb 81 p 1)

Unit 83028--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 3)

Unit 83051--A fighter of a command company of this unit wrote a letter to the editor lamenting that excessive inspections have adversely affected the company's work. (18 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83127--An innovations team of a repair section of this unit successfully developed a 40mm grenade launcher that is easy to operate and performs well. A photo shows technician Yang Yuxiang [2799 3768 3276] and fighters of the company together testing the grenade launcher. (22 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83209--The 1st Company of this unit is mentioned. (4 Jul 79 p 4)

Unit 83229--This unit is identified. (18 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83230--This unit is identified. (21 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 83232--An artillery company of this unit is mentioned. (5 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83233--The 6th Company of this unit is noted for its training achievements in the three attacks and three defenses. (22 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 83249--The 84th Detachment of this unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 83352--This unit is stationed on islands in an unidentified forward position. Wei Zhendong [5588 2182 2639] is identified as the regimental commander and Shao Qizhu [6730 3825 3796] is identified as a political commissar. (21 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 83368--A ship transport zhongdui of this unit is actively engaged in scientific studies. (27 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 83432--This unit is mentioned. (28 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 83470--This unit is mentioned. (10 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 83475--For more than two years, the 3rd Battalion of this unit has been able to save a large sum of money in war preparedness construction work. (22 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 84636--This unit is mentioned. (5 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 84641--This unit is mentioned. (7 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 84807--The 2nd Company of this unit is mentioned. (30 Aug 79 p 2)

Unit 84810--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 84819--The fighters of the 4th Company of this unit held a meeting to discuss the issue of liberating thinking. (8 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 84827--The 86th Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (7 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 84859--The party committee of this unit adopted effective measures to improve work style in party organizations. (4 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 84870--The 9th Company of an unidentified unit is making full use of existing equipment to rigorously train in antitank skills. A photo shows Company Commander Huang Tianzhang [7806 1131 2222] and fighters together studying ways to attack "enemy" tanks. (15 Jun 79 p 1)

Unit 84877--This unit is identified. (14 Feb 81 p 4)

Unit 86001--Huang Chao [7806 6389] is identified as the regimental commander of an unidentified air force unit. (17 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 86379--This unit is mentioned. (3 Jun 79 p 3)

Unit 87311--Fan Decai [5400 1795 2088], deputy director of the political department of this unit, died on 5 April 79 in Beijing. (2 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 88710--The 51st Fendui of this unit is mentioned. (27 Jun 79 p 4)

Unit 89214--A member of the 2nd Company of a repair battalion developed a machine to straighten frames of vehicles. (12 Jun 79 p 2)

Unit 89352--This unit is placing emphasis on promoting the use of television for political education at the company level. (14 Feb 81 p 2)

Hospital 222--This hospital belongs to the Shenyang Units. (20 Feb 81 p 2)

Hospital 261--This hospital belongs to the Beijing Units. (22 Jun 79 p 2)

CSO: 4005/2087

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

INFORMATION ON MILITARY, OTHER PERSONNEL

[The following biographic information is taken from various issues of JIEFANGJUN BAO, published in Beijing. The date in parenthesis refers to date of newspaper report.]

Chen Jingwu [7115 2529 2976] is identified as the deputy commander of a flight dadui of an unidentified air force regiment of the Shenyang Units. (9 Jul 79 p 1)

Gu Hui [0942 6540] is identified as the commander of an unidentified division of the Guangxi border units which took part in the self-defense counterattack war. A photo shows him and comrades of a command unit summing up combat experiences. (14 Jun 79 p 1)

Guo Xizhang [6753 6932 4545], regimental commander of an unidentified unit of the Nanjing Units, was promoted deputy division commander in February 1979. (12 Jun 79 p 1)

Lin Xiangsong [2651 4382 2646] is identified as the commander of vessel 4420 of an unidentified PLA navy minesweeping dadui. (18 Jun 79 p 3)

Luo Yuanbao [5012 0955 0202] is identified as a deputy political commissar of an unidentified regiment of the Fuzhou Units. (28 Jun 79 p 1)

Ma Dasheng [7456 1129 5116] is identified as the division commander of an unidentified army of the Nanjing Units. (11 Jun 79 p 1)

Wang Lianheng [3769 6647 1854] is identified as the commander of a tank regiment of an unidentified unit under the Beijing Garrison Command. (11 Jun 79 p 1)

Wu Zhongling [0702 1813 1545], commander of the 1st Tank Battalion of an unidentified armored unit of the Nanjing Units, learned from model cadres of the self-defense counterattack war and set an example in doing a good job in various work. A photo shows him meticulously cleaning a cartridge belt. (11 Jun 79 p 1)

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Yang Shaobo [2799 4801 3134], deputy division commander of an unidentified unit of the Nanjing Units, is shown in a photo carrying out antitank training together with cadres and fighters of a company. (12 Jun 79 p 1)

Zhai Yuanzhen [5049 0955 6297] is identified as the deputy commander of an unidentified army. (11 Mar 81 p 2)

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